Mobile agents appear
INTRODUCTION
This paper considers policy-based authorisation frameworks for the mobile environment, with the objective of providing both mobile devices and service providers with the ability to assign appropriate privileges to mobile agents. Whilst frameworks for policy decisionmaking have previously been considered in a general mobile code context, this paper focuses on the special requirements resulting from mobile agents in a mobile environment, which restrict the types of frameworks that may be viable. Specific implementation requirements are then extracted, regarding the capabilities the policy specification approach chosen to express the above frameworks should possess. Following this, candidate policy specification languages are examined, and conclusions drawn as regards their suitability for framework expression.
ARCHITECTUAL MODELS
The initial step in constructing a policy-based framework involves the development of the underlying architecture, the identification of the parties involved, the assignment of roles and responsibilities to each of the identified participants, the definition of protocols associated with the architecture, and the selection of the authorisation techniques to be deployed in the framework from state of the art technologies. We begin with a critical analysis of a number of different potential scenarios, so that the fundamental requirements that an architecture for mobile agent authorisation in a mobile environment may possess, as regards framework, and policy expression of that framework, can be unearthed. The first scenario involves four parties: the CAs, the device manufacturer, the code author, and the host device, containing the public key of its manufacturer. Each code author and device manufacturer possesses a public/private key pair and an X.509 public key certificate issued by their chosen CA. When a code author distributes code, he must first apply to a device manufacturer for consent, who responds with a signed attribute statement consisting of an identity element and an authorisation status element. The latter may be positive or negative, depending on the decision of the device manufacturer; this decision may be based on a series of tests or conditions that the code author must fulfil. The code author can then sign and distribute code, together with the attribute statement. When the code is received by a device, the signature of the code author on the code is verified, the signature of the device manufacturer on the attribute statement is verified, the presence of the code author's identity in the attribute statement is established, and, finally, the authorisation status is checked. If all checks are positive, agent execution is authorised and access permission granted to the device. This system is very basic and the authorisation technique is very generic. An author is labelled either safe or unsafe, with no allowance for the possibility that not all code coming from a particular source is of a similar standard. In this scenario much responsibility is placed on the device manufacturer -it is not clear whether the device manufacturer should be made the sole trusted point. The fundamental concepts in the next scenario closely mirror those described in MExE, where four participant groups are identified: agent recipients/host devices, device manufacturers, network operators, and Trusted Third Parties (TTPs). The latter three groups have execution environments defined for them on each host device, environments whose associated access privileges diminish in list order. There is also a fourth 'restricted' domain where unsigned code is sent. As with the previous architecture, this scenario is rather restrictive because authorisation is based solely on the identity of the party who signed the code; it also leads to questions as to why the device manufacturer is more trustworthy than a network operator. Participants in the third scenario include CAs, TTPs, and the host devices, containing the public keys of the TPs they trust. The code author first submits the agent to a chosen TTP for testing. The type or level of testing which the code undergoes is up to the author, and may include the formulation and verification of proofs, Necula and Lee (1), the capturing of behavioural models and the validation of the behaviour described in these models, Sekar et al (2) , or the definition of state appraisal functions, Berkovits et al (3) , which can be checked and verified by devices receiving code. The TTP then assembles and signs an attribute statement consisting of the test results and an agent identifier, e.g. a hash-value of the agent itself. When the agent is received by a device, the signature of the TTP on the attribute statement and the code identifier are verified. Finally the code is assigned to one of three predefined domains, ranging from the most restrictive domain, where code that has achieved success in a basic level of testing is executed, to the most trusted environment. In this scenario incoming code without an attribute statement is not executed. If, on the other hand, the signature on the attribute certificate is that of an unknown TP, a chain of trust may be set up where a TP trusted by the device affirms that the TP is capable of testing agent code. In this situation, a textbox offers the device user/owner the option of trusting a TP affirmed by a TTP. It may appear that this method offers no more security than the first code signing scenario, but this technique allows a broader range of code to be trusted, and the trust concept is also better defined. The device owner trusts the TTP to carry out the specified tests on the code, unlike the first scenario where the device owner/user must trust that the device manufacturer knows what he is doing when he approves a code vendor, thereby approving all code from that vendor. Here, should a problem arise with a malicious agent, it is reasonably easy to assign responsibility to the TTP in question if testing was not carried out accurately or correctly and thereby may deter fraudulent TTPs. Moreover, in this case the concept of transient trust using certificate chains can be used much more effectively. This model does, however, require much more processing at the device. In addition to signature verification, state appraisal functions may have to be checked, or execution of agents monitored, to ensure behavioural models are adhered to. It may also be difficult to assign an agent to a particular domain based on test results, as no standard test methods currently exist. With the addition of access control lists, containing the identities and public keys of trusted code producers, to devices, certain agents may be authorized to bypass security checks. If code is received with a signature that can be verified with a public key stored in the ACL, it is immediately allowed to execute in the trusted execution environment; otherwise the agent code undergoes the checks outlined above. This modification improves efficiency but may jeopardise the security of the entire network should a user be permitted to add identities to the 'trusted code producer' ACL. Alternatively ACLs can be used to increase the security of the system. In this case, code must not only be sent with an attribute statement signed by a TTP, but must also possess the signature of a trusted code producer whose identity is stored in the ACL. This set-up may however be too restrictive for the free flow of mobile agents. It may also necessitate the storage of large ACLs in resource-restricted devices. In the next scenario, a proxy server sits at the domain periphery, and participants include TTPs, the agent producer, the proxy, and the device itself. After agent creation, the producer or a chosen TTP formulates security controls for distribution with the mobile code, e.g. a proof of code correctness. When a proxy receives the agent package, the signature of the agent creator on the code is verified, and the proofs, models and appraisal functions that may accompany the code are examined. A 'results file' is constructed and signed by the proxy, containing the agent identity and the results of the test verification. Each device then verifies the signature of the proxy on the results file, and decides on which of the predefined execution environments to assign the code, depending on the test results. The use of the domain server offloads much of the computational load from the device, freeing up the CPU cycles of the device and allowing for more computationally intensive checks to be done. The need for the TTP could be avoided by assigning responsibility for performing all tests to the domain proxy server after which they would construct a 'resulting attribute file', which would be signed and forwarded to the destination device who would then place the agent in the appropriate attribute dependent domain. In this case the agent could simply be distributed after construction. This modification simplifies the trust relationships that are required, as domain servers, implicitly trusted by the devices that use it, carry out all testing. However efficiency issues arise, as all domain servers may have to carry out the same tests on code. To reduce the load, trust relationships may be formed between proxies as regards testing, allowing domain servers to request previously constructed agent attribute statements from proxies they trust. As a further modification, the comparison between the device use conditions and agent attributes could also be made on the proxy, which would then attach a domain label to the code, sign and forward it. This avoids the risk of uninformed device owners/users changing policy statements on devices in unwise ways and further reduces device processing requirements. A domain server is also used in this next scenario, where the proxy has two main constituents: a set of execution environments simulating device types, and a database. The code producer signs the agent code and circulates it. Agent creation by the agent sender involves combining the program code with its execution state. The mobile agent can then be disseminated across the network. On its receipt by a proxy server, the signature of the code author and the agent sender are verified, and the agent is then executed in a simulator mirroring the destination device of the agent. If malicious behaviour is attempted by the code in the simulator, the code is discarded and a record of the code failure is made in the profile of the code author or the code sender (if the malicious behaviour was caused by state information). Conversely, if the code behaves as expected, a note is made of this in the profiles of both the code author and code sender. This method, rather then confining the examination of agents to specific tests, allows for the discovery of any violations the agent code may attempt. It does, however, mean that every agent must be executed twice, which may lead to efficiency problems. However the profile database may allow domain severs to authorise agent code without simulated execution, after a certain positive profile level has been achieved. The final scenario is based on Berkovits et al (3) . It involves the author of the code signing: the executable, a state appraisal function which, as a function of the agent's current state, outputs the maximum set of permissions to be accorded to the agent running the program (max), and a sender permission list of the program code, including every destination entitled to receive and use the code. An authorised agent sender signs: the agent, the agent digest (also signed by the code author), a state appraisal function 'req', used to calculate the permissions the sender wants the agent to run with, and a place permission list. When a host receives an agent, the signatures of both the author and the sender are verified, the existence of the sender identity in the SPL of the code author and its own identity in the PPL of the code sender are checked, and both the state appraisal functions are calculated and, if max > req, access is granted, else the agent is discarded. This architecture offers a comprehensive solution, although it requires much work on the part of the code producer and agent creator. This scenario also requires that the SPL and PPL be defined in advance, not the most practical solution for a distributed mobile environment. Although the construction of the ideal framework architecture is a topic for future work, analysis of the above scenarios enables attributes required of the final model to be extracted. These include minimum use of the device CPU, minimum use of device disk space for storage of security controls (e.g. key storage, ACLs), authorisation based on the actual agent/code and not merely the code producer as in MExE, comprehensive test sets using proved, reliable technologies such as appraisal functions, proofs of code, behavioural models or preexecution device simulators, and use of TTPs or preferably domain servers.
POLICY EXPRESSION MECHANISMS
As the next step towards the construction of a policybased framework, the problem of expression of both the policy and signed attribute statements outlined above, is now considered. By examining the above scenarios, a comprehensive list of policy expression requirements can be extracted, aiding the analysis of security policy specification languages. From an attribute statement perspective, the chosen language must support: signed attribute statements, boolean expressions for elements such as authorisation status, inclusion of agent identity e.g. a hash of the agent, expression of agent code author or agent sender identities in a chosen form e.g. distinguished names, (preferably) inclusion of X.509 public key certificates in attribute statements, and element expression e.g. test specification or agent attribute expression (including e.g. boolean values, numerical values or character data). Regarding policy statements, ACL expression, and authorisation policy expression based on constraints or conditions, should be facilitated. A policy engine capable of: verifying agent signatures or attribute certificates, using either public keys stored in the device/proxy or retrieved via a method such as OCSP, comparison between attribute and policy statements, processing of credential chains used for transient trust relationships, and interaction with other applications, is also necessary. Selecting a security policy specification technique involved examining a large group of policy specification languages, so that languages meriting detailed consideration could be identified. This group included: PLAS, ASL, Keynote, Nereus, SPL, Ponder, XML, AuthXML, S2ML, SAML, XACML, TPL and XML security standards. Keynote, Ponder, SAML and generic XML were chosen for detailed consideration.
Keynote
Keynote is defined as 'a unified approach to specifying and interpreting security policies, credentials, and relationships and it allows direct authorisation of security critical actions', Blaze et al (4) . It is a descendent of the PolicyMaker system, that introduced the concept of a 'trust management system'. Fundamental components of Keynote include: principals, capable of requesting actions and issuing assertions, actions, i.e. trusted operations under the control of Keynote, and assertions of which there are two types. A policy assertion is issued by a special principal, 'policy' who provides the root of trust, are used to delegate authority to otherwise untrusted principals, and make up a Keynote security policy; and a signed assertion/credential is created and signed by the principals authorised in policy assertions, and can be distributed over the network. Finally there is the Keynote compliance checker, which takes an issued query containing a proposed action attribute set from an identified principal, all credentials and policy assertions and determines the appropriate compliance value from a set of possible responses. Attempts to express the above scenarios in Keynote were successful, illustrating that Keynote is a simple and flexible language, easy to read and write. The fact that one unified language is useable for both credential and policy expression is practical and convenient. The documentation, outlining the features and attributes of the language, is also clear and precise. Signed credentials are a major attraction of this technique, in conjunction with the fact that credential chains can be used. The following fragments illustrate how components of the first scenario may be expressed.
The code vendor signs his code and distributes it with the credential. When received, a request is made by the agent for execution on the device, and the following action attribute set may be sent to the compliance checker, who returns the compliance value 'execute': _ACTION_AUTHORIZERS = "RSA 654873" app_domain = "agent execution" authstatus = "yes"
It must also be noted that, with Keynote, the necessity for the definition of external semantics or schema so that credentials can be interpreted, is alleviated. However, the name of the application domain, over which action attributes should be interpreted, may be cited in the attribute named "app_domain". It is then the responsibility of another suitable authority to provide a registry of reserved app_domain names, which lists the names and meanings of each application's attributes (4) . This helps to ensure that credentials all are interpreted as intended thus making smooth interoperability possible. Nereus, Miklos (5), developed from Keynote, is also relevant. By adding a 'credential type' element, defining whether a credential is for 'binding' attributes to entities or for 'delegating' the authority to bind, the purpose of a particular credential becomes much clearer. The elements 'attribute name' and 'attribute value' are also identified, counteracting the criticism Keynote may receive for lacking this feature, which is central to many other policy specification languages.
Ponder
The second policy specification language investigated is Ponder. It was constructed with new technologies such as mobile agents in mind, and is both object-oriented and declarative. The language allows for the expression of many different policy types, including authorisation policies, information filtering policies, delegation policies, obligation policies; and refrain policies. The basic specification elements of this policy can be defined separately and reused. These include event definitions, used to trigger obligation policies, constraint definitions, used to limit the applicability of basic policies, and constant definitions. Composite policies, which facilitate policy management in large complex systems, can also be defined. By using groups, roles, inheritance, role relationships, management structures and meta policies, basic policies can be grouped in such a way that the organisational structure is reflected, Damianou et al (6) . In the initial examination of the Ponder specification language, it appeared to have much potential, offering a wider range of policy type specification than most. The rules for composite policy construction are also explicitly defined, making the management of large systems much simpler. The probable occurrence of conflict or inconsistencies among policy statements was also considered and meta-policies can be implemented to alleviate this. However, problems arose in relation to our predefined scenarios. One major issue relates to the fact that this particular language assumes prior authentication, and acts merely as an access control mechanism, unlike Keynote which supports both authentication and access control. Also, Ponder is a language designed for policy statement specification but not attribute statement specification. Thus, if implemented in our policy-based authorisation mechanism, alternative mechanisms would be needed to allow expression of authentication and attribute statements. Using Ponder the policy statement in scenario one may appear in the form of a positive authorisation policy, allowing all actions to be executed by incoming code authenticated as device manufacturer approved, with a positive authorisation status:
Inst auth+
Incoming_Agent_Auth { subject DMAuthenticated_mobile_agent; target /host system -elements of system that should not under any circumstances, be accessed or modified; action *; when (authorisation status = yes); } / / mobileagentexecution
Although this language appears readable, construction of policy statements is not easy. Constraints are expressed using a subset of OMG's OCL, which is not very userfriendly to the nonprogrammer.
SAML
The third specification language investigated is SAML, constructed by the OASIS security services technical committee through amalgamation of work on S2ML and AuthXML. SAML is an XML-based, platformindependent, language for the encoding and expression of authentication and authorisation information, DeJesus (7). The fundamental elements include: the principal, who requires access to resources, the principal domain, where the principal can be authenticated without input from any other domain, the secondary domain, where a principal can be authenticated with the help of the primary domain, the authentication authority, who binds the principal's name to an authentication method in a name assertion, the authorisation authority, who is responsible for binding the principal's name to a name assertion in an 'entitlement assertion', the session authority who binds the principals session state to a 'name assertion' in a session assertion, a policy enforcement point, which authenticates the principal with the help of a policy decision point and controls access to resources in the secondary domain, and the policy decision point, responsible for authenticating the principal and determining its eligibility to access resources in the secondary domain, OASIS (8) . There are three data objects that can be used in SAML: authentication assertions, which assert that the issuer has authenticated a specific target, attribute assertions, which assert that a subject has specific attributes, and authorisation assertions, which assert that a subject has been granted specific authorisations to access particular resources. These are issued by SAML authentication authorities, attribute authorities, and policy decision points. Attribute and protocol schema documents are used in order to 'define names of elements, their attributes and to specify rules for their combination and sequence', Ray (9) . The protocols and systems components defined for SAML fit very well to the requirements extracted from the scenario frameworks. The language itself is no more complex then generic XML, appears easy to read and write, and is both clear and unambiguous. A SAML assertion schema has been defined such that credentials/attribute statements will be universally interpreted in a similar manner. Regarding the predefined requirements, the assertion schema has many of the necessary elements providing the ability to express many of the attribute statements, but several of our particular scenarios require the definition of additional namespaces. This graceful extensibility is a distinctive feature of the language. A protocol schema is also defined, making the transfer of data a standardised process. The attribute credential for the code producer in the first scenario may appear as follows, where the arbitrary block of XML describing the attribute name and value presumably follow a schema specified in the defined namespace: This particular scheme, however, only covers the expression of credentials, but information does exist on the integration of SAML with XML-based policy specification languages.
Generic XML
Finally we consider generic XML, from which languages such as SAML were created. XML is a toolkit for creating and using markup languages. A document model must first be constructed in one of two ways. The first involves the use of the document type definition (DTD), a set of rules or declarations on the tags that can be used, and what each tag may contain. The second method is the XML schema. A schema uses XML fragments called templates, demonstrating how a document should look. From examination of SAML and the capabilities of generic XML, it is clear that a schema can be developed specifically to meet all the requirements that arise in relation to a policy-based framework developed for mobile agent authorisation as regards both policy and credential expression.
CONCLUSIONS
This work will contribute to research on mobile agent authorisation in the mobile environment. From the fundamental requirements highlighted as regards a decision-making architecture, and the analysis of chosen security policy specification techniques, future work will involve the proposal and expression of a definitive policybased framework using SAML for credential expression and security information exchange, and an XML schema defined specifically for policy statement expression on the host device or proxy server.
